Corrosion is the biggest enemy of transmission pipelines. According to PHSMA, about 40% of pipeline damage and leakage is the direct result of corrosion, and other types of pipeline damage, such as excavation and natural force damage, are also highly associated with pipeline corrosion and can be easily triggered. Overall, soil corrosivity is the key and influences the degree of corrosion that happens on a pipeline.
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In this section, the objective is to determine the soil corrosivity and assess the corrosion risks of pipelines by developing a continuous soil corrosivity index surface by using ArcMap and ArcGIS Pro in Harris County. Given the fact that soil corrosivity is influenced by a number of different soil properties at different levels, multi-criteria evaluation (MCE) was used as the technique to determine soil corrosivity in Harris County.
Corrosion is the biggest enemy of transmission pipelines. According to PHSMA, about 40% of pipeline damage and leakage is the direct result of corrosion, and other types of pipeline damage, such as excavation and natural force damage, are also highly associated with pipeline corrosion and can be easily triggered. Overall, soil corrosivity is the key and influences the degree of corrosion that happens on a pipeline.
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In this section, the objective is to determine the soil corrosivity and assess the corrosion risks of pipelines by developing a continuous soil corrosivity index surface by using ArcMap and ArcGIS Pro in Harris County. Given the fact that soil corrosivity is influenced by a number of different soil properties at different levels, multi-criteria evaluation (MCE) was used as the technique to determine soil corrosivity in Harris County.
The lack of preparedness of local governments and energy companies led to this serious state-wide power outage and energy crisis. Therefore, to prevent similar series of disasters from happening, it is crucial to ensure and assess the resiliency and integrity of current transmission pipelines in the State of Texas.
In this project, the main objective is to investigate the driving factors of pipeline incidents (failures, accidents) of currently existing pipelines.
The lack of preparedness of local governments and energy companies led to this serious state-wide power outage and energy crisis. Therefore, to prevent similar series of disasters from happening, it is crucial to ensure and assess the resiliency and integrity of current transmission pipelines in the State of Texas.
In this project, the main objective is to investigate the driving factors of pipeline incidents (failures, accidents) of currently existing pipelines.
Introduction
On Valentine's Day in 2021, the State of Texas was attacked by a rare burst of Arctic air that traveled across Canada and the Central US. Three severe winter storms swept across the state in the following ten days. As a result, the temperature dropped to nearly zero, and a widespread energy outage happened, which created serious shortages of heat, water, and food for more than four million Texans.
Figure1: Satellite image of Houston - Before and during the power crisis
The extensive state-wide energy crisis was the direct result of the power grid collapse. Texas has its own complete independent power interconnection. However, its interconnection was severely impacted by the storms and failed to provide enough electricity for around 34% of all houses in Texas. Due to this isolation, Texas was also unable to 'borrow' power from neighbouring interconnections and resolve its power deficit.
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More importantly, what triggered the original collapse of the interconnection in Texas was actually the unsuccessful delivery of fuel resources via transmission pipelines. Fuels such as liquified natural gas, crude oil, and hydrocarbon (HGL) gas, are the most important raw materials for electricity generation in Texas. In fact, natural gas is the largest source of power generation in Texas which provides more than 40,000 MW of supply during peak periods (EIA, 2021). The frigid temperature and destructive snowstorms caused many pipelines and associated facilities to freeze up or have mechanical failures, and ultimately lowered the fuel supplies to local power plants and resulted in an extensive power outage. Below in figure 2, an obvious decrease in natural gas power was observed right after the Feb. 14th snowstorm, with a significant 10,000 megawatts decrease in Texan interconnection power generation.
Figure 2: Power generated right before & after the Feb. 14th storm by the Texan interconnection -The amount of natural gas power dropped significantly